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Editorial 
The Challenge of Complexity 
 
The socio-technical systems of modern societies — such as the energy system or 
the financial markets — are complex systems. They are complex because of the 
number of interconnected components and the degree of interdependence between 
the actors, organizations, institutions and technologies involved. Attempts to gov-
ern these systems often fail or fall short of reaching their goals. 
The article of Gerhard Fuchs and Sandra Wassermann analyzes the transformation 
of the energy system. It argues that successful innovations in the field of renewable 
energies depend on advocacy coalitions and the creation of niche markets – thus 
referring to the article of Rüdiger Mautz, which was published in the last issue 
(1/08) of STI-Studies. 
Ekatarina Svetlova deals with the strategies of portfolio managers in financial mar-
kets to cope with the everyday challenge of complexity. She argues that complexity 
is a necessary ingredient of markets, which is reproduced by the heterogeneity of 
actors’ attempts to reduce complexity. 
Due to different technical reasons, this issue contains only two articles. But we are 
facing subsequent issues with a ‘normal’ number of contributions. 
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Picking a Winner? 
Innovation in Photovoltaics and the Political Creation of 
Niche Markets 
Gerhard Fuchs, Sandra Wassermann (University of Stuttgart) 
 
received 12 Sept. 2007, received in revised form 5 Sept. 2008, accepted 15 Nov. 2008 
Abstract 
Innovation theory has pointed to the complex, non-linear character of innovation 
processes. Heterogeneous networks of actors including a mixed spectrum of many 
and diverse academic, economic, and governmental agencies combine to achieve 
innovations. Is there any role for innovation policy beyond influencing framework 
conditions in such a situation? The article analyzes the case of a successful innova-
tion in the energy sector: photovoltaics. It argues that - given the special character-
istics of the energy sector – successful innovation depended on strong political 
support and an advocacy coalition, which achieved institutional backing. The 
method chosen to realize the innovation was the creation of a niche market with 
the help of regulatory instruments. 
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1 Introduction 
The energy system in industrialized 
nations is changing in what can be 
seen as an example of a technological 
and institutional regime change. Victor 
(2002) sees the sector in its third struc-
tural transformation. The exact out-
come of this regime change is uncer-
tain. But one element of a future new 
governance structure will be an in-
creasing importance of decentralized 
forms of electric power generation, a 
shift towards more environmentally 
sustainable technologies, e.g. renew-
able energy technologies, which in the 
past were pushed forward by a coali-
tion of diverse actors. One of the inno-
vative developments in the area of 
renewable energy technologies will be 
analyzed in this article: photovoltaics 
(PV). 
We will use a broad lens in order to 
examine the growth of PV both as a 
source of electric power generation 
and as a business sector in Germany. 
PV can be considered as an unusual 
success story in which the ability of 
state authorities to strongly influence 
renewable energy production and as-
sociated economic activity becomes 
apparent. 
It will be argued that the growth of 
renewable energy proceeds within 
networks of governance, which com-
prise formal regimes at multiple levels, 
informal norms and practices as well 
as market structures and processes. 
These networks involve national and 
sub-national authorities, multilateral 
institutions, firms and NGOs. Techno-
logical development and market 
growth of PV are thus viewed as em-
bedded in a broad social, economic, 
and political system of governance. 
Corporate strategies, social move-
ments and public policy constitute this 
sector’s essential elements of govern-
ance. We will further argue that PV 
policy in Germany is characterized by a 
commitment to a specific mission, a 
concertation of the main actors, a long 
term orientation and substantive sub-
sidies. Insofar PV appears as a suc-
cessful “planned” innovation, rarely 
found in the relevant literature. 
Caniels/Romijn (2008: 246) have ar-
gued that the literature on strategic 
niche management is short of success 
stories. Thus, we know little about the 
processes by which (policy and tech-
nological) experiments can ultimately 
culminate in viable market niches that 
ultimately will contribute to a regime 
change in a specific sector. The pre-
sent article will try to fill this gap. 
We will start with a clarification of our 
concept of innovation and then de-
scribe the elements of the technologi-
cal system PV. Based on this we will 
discuss the ingredients of the success 
story. At the moment it would be fool-
ish to claim that PV will remain a suc-
cess story in the future and eventually 
play a dominant role in the develop-
ment of a new energy regime. PV is 
growing but it is still in its infant state 
– albeit already bigger than many “es-
tablished” sectors. Only few publica-
tions have focused on the particular 
technological and institutional prereq-
uisites, which enabled photovoltaics to 
become a real success story, outcom-
peting – from an innovation perspec-
tive – other energy technologies. 
2 Innovation and Sectoral Sys-
tems of Innovation 
Before discussing the German innova-
tion policy focussing on the develop-
ment and market expansion of photo-
voltaics, we have to outline the con-
ceptual framework of our analysis. We 
start with some general reflections on 
innovation and innovation policy, 
drawing on the literature on systems 
of innovation and strategic niche man-
agement on the one hand and the ad-
vocacy coalition approach on the 
other. 
2.1 Innovation Policy 
Since the 1990s a global policy-shift 
towards research and technology can 
be observed: the promotion of innova-
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tion has become the centre piece of 
official national as well as of supra- 
and sub-national policies. This shift in 
emphasis reflects discussions on the 
role of the state in promoting technol-
ogy as well as new ideas about how 
new technologies become successful 
on the markets. 
The traditional model in research and 
technology policies either centred on 
the support of basic research which 
eventually should bring about new 
technologies ripe for the markets 
(technology push) or opted for a mis-
sion oriented approach promoting a 
specific new technology and financing 
its development by certain companies 
or research laboratories. (cf. 
Hiskes/Hiskes 1986) 
Innovation research, however, has 
shown that there is no linear develop-
ment of technological innovation to-
wards successful adoption and diffu-
sion (cf. Van de Ven et al. 1999). Sup-
port of basic research does not guar-
antee the eventual development of 
products that become widely accepted 
and thus achieve commercial success. 
But exactly “success on the market” 
seems to become top priority in times 
of increasing worldwide competition 
on crowded markets. The introduction 
of new, innovative products is consid-
ered to be a precondition for keeping a 
competitive edge. 
In parallel discussions on the steering 
capacities of the state a dire picture 
was painted, accentuating the convic-
tion that the state cannot successfully 
choose technologies, which will later 
be a success on the market. Along with 
an increasingly prevalent attitude that 
markets are the best innovators and 
should be left alone, policy instru-
ments worldwide seemed to converge 
(cf. Holzinger/Jörgens/Knill 2007). This 
neoliberal understanding, the support 
of market dominance and “the retreat 
of the state” (Strange 1996)   emerged 
in the 1990s,  and was accompanied by 
new types of policies and policy in-
struments, which also affected the 
conception of technology policy. Re-
search and technology policy has now 
turned into innovation policy and 
mainly focuses on funding basic re-
search and networking activities – in 
particular joint projects between firms 
and research institutes – in order to 
stimulate knowledge flows and to en-
sure that results in scientific research 
may be used and adopted commer-
cially (cf. Nooteboom 1999, Edquist 
2001:18). Networks may facilitate pro-
ducer-customer relationships or even 
result in the creation of an advocacy 
coalition, which experts consider an 
important pre-condition for successful 
radical innovations (cf. Weimer-
Jehle/Fuchs 2007). 
Although the market discourse has 
achieved nearly universal legitimacy, 
counter tendencies have always been 
visible as well. One of the policy meas-
ures relying more on the activities of 
public actors is the politically sup-
ported creation of niche markets. This 
new form of innovation policy selects a 
certain technology (or its pre-stage) in 
advance and tries to speed up its de-
velopment, and even might help to 
shape the mode of its application. 
Such politically created niche markets 
work through market stimulation pro-
grammes, like subsidies or the provi-
sion of soft loans for prospective cus-
tomers, as well as through modes of 
legitimizing the developing technology 
in order to raise its public acceptance 
(cf. Edler 2007).  Especially in the area 
of environmental technologies, strate-
gic niche management has increas-
ingly become accepted as an instru-
ment of innovation policy (cf. Kemp et 
al 1998; Kemp 2002; Coenen 2002) 
with the hope that even a transforma-
tion of a whole technological regime 
can be enabled (cf. Berkhout et al 
2003: 4; Caniels/Romijn 2008). 
But in both cases the actual design of 
national policies has to consider exist-
ing institutional frameworks and 
socio-cultural conditions. Studies in 
the tradition of the Varieties of Capital-
ism approach (Hall/Soskice 2001) 
 
96 STI Studies 2008: 93-113 
 
claim, that if national innovation pol-
icy stresses and uses national com-
parative institutional advantages, it 
can be more successful. In other words 
a system dominated by non-market 
coordination will have difficulties 
pushing new technologies dependent 
on a flexible and quick functioning of 
market mechanisms. While on the 
other hand the support of technologies 
which require the non-market coordi-
nation of various actors will be difficult 
in liberal market economies. Based on 
this highly stylised interpretation we 
argue that the creation of (sheltered) 
niche markets can be a successful pol-
icy instrument especially in coordi-
nated market economies (hypothesis 
1). 
Considering the fact, that photovol-
taics can be seen as a technological 
innovation that is supported in order 
to transform the energy sector, the 
existence of political and social forces 
which strongly oppose photovoltaics 
due to ideological and economic (rent 
seeking) reasons can be assumed. As 
Jänicke has shown, changes in actor 
constellations have resulted in im-
proved terms for innovation in envi-
ronmentally friendly products (cf. 
1997: 7). With regard to actor constel-
lations and situational factors enhanc-
ing policy change, the policy analysis 
literature refers to the role of advocacy 
coalitions that are crucially important 
in order to spur institutional or cul-
tural changes (cf. Litfin 2000). There-
fore we argue that the success of inno-
vation policy depends on its ability to 
create and mobilise an advocacy coali-
tion supporting the aimed technology, 
especially if strong incumbent actors 
(like in the established energy system) 
exist (hypothesis 2). 
2.2 Innovation 
Innovation can be defined as artefacts, 
processes, ideas, strategies, which 
successfully change routines and are 
embedded in specific contexts of de-
velopment and usage. Innovation as 
such is not just a new idea or technical 
system, but one, which is being suc-
cessfully implemented. Including the 
processes of implementation, however, 
it becomes difficult to disentangle e.g. 
the technical artefact from the way it is 
being developed and used. 
Innovation in this sense is not a linear 
process but occurs by interactive rela-
tionships and feedback mechanisms 
between institutional and organisa-
tional elements of science, technology, 
learning, production, policy, firms and 
potential or actual market demand. 
Some technologies may only become 
innovations due to interactions be-
tween producers and users or the spe-
cific way; customers use and apply 
new technical artefacts (cf. Malerba 
2004: 24). The acceptance and use of a 
new technology at any rate plays a 
crucial role in the innovation process. 
Thus new – better – technologies in 
our context are only referred to as in-
novations, if they find their way to the 
market. 
2.3 Innovation and Uncertainty 
It is generally acknowledged that every 
(economic) activity has to face the 
problem of uncertainty (Beckert 1996). 
This is even more so in the case of 
innovations, particularly if potential 
new products would have to cope with 
incumbent products and existing infra-
structures and routines supporting 
them. Proven ways to cope with uncer-
tainty are the development and reli-
ance on routines, customs, regula-
tions, established institutions etc. 
Innovating firms may not know which 
application or design a new technology 
should be given in order to be success-
ful in the market. This can lead firms 
to hesitate implementing significant 
changes, even as they face a volatile 
environment that increases pressures 
to introduce new products, seek new 
markets and introduce new technolo-
gies, practices and organisational 
methods into their production proc-
esses. Uncertainty can also make it 
more difficult for firms to obtain exter-
nal funding for their innovation pro-
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jects. Customers may not trust a new 
and unproven technology. This leads 
to another mechanism blocking the 
diffusion of a new technology, which is 
lack of legitimacy. 
We are here confronted with the para-
dox that innovation as a routine 
changing mechanism, nevertheless 
also depends on routines, albeit newly 
developing ones. Therefore innovation 
policy can aim to reduce uncertainty 
by establishing a mix of policy instru-
ments along with a viable support coa-
lition. Whenever, e.g. innovation policy 
can provide technological develop-
ments with legitimacy, the financial 
system will become more willing to 
invest in innovative firms and potential 
customers may feel more safe and be 
more induced to purchase new tech-
nologies (cf. Carlsson/Jacobsson 1997: 
285). 
The role of uncertainty can be seen 
very clearly if we look at the develop-
ments in the 1990s when the German 
PV industry was close to become ex-
tinct. Production facilities were moved, 
since producers considered it uncer-
tain whether the institutional frame-
work in Germany could provide fa-
vourable conditions for the further 
development of the PV industry. 
As Edquist suggests, a systemic view 
on innovation policy should not only 
analyse the role of the state but also 
include feedback mechanisms to find 
out how the rest of the system, social 
structures, routines or even discrete 
occurrences influence innovation poli-
cies (cf. 2001: 17). German governance 
has always been characterised by close 
linkages and common interests be-
tween government, industry, business 
associations and unions (cf. 
Hall/Soskice 2001; Harding 2000). This 
established arrangement has shaped 
German innovation policies and most 
probably will also do so in the case of 
PV. 
 
2.4 The Transformation of Electric 
Power Generation 
Photovoltaics is treated as an innova-
tion within and for the industrial sec-
tor of electric power generation. As 
already briefly mentioned this sector is 
undergoing severe changes in nearly 
all industrialized nations. The dynam-
ics leading to these changes are also 
important to understand the case of 
PV, because they opened up a window 
of opportunity, which helped to push 
forward this new option. 
The traditional electric power system 
can be characterized as a large techni-
cal system (cf. Mayntz/Hughes 1988) 
with tightly coupled components run 
by a few, powerful incumbent actors. 
Energy generation is highly centralized 
in big power stations, open markets 
hardly exist. Price regulation and fixa-
tion is common and huge subsidies for 
the development of old and new tech-
nologies (e.g. coal, nuclear energy) 
make it difficult to determine “real” 
prizes. It is suggested that the costs of 
producing electricity, gained out of 
coal or oil would double, if intranspar-
ent external costs were taken into ac-
count (cf. Milborrow 2002: 32). Incum-
bent energy technologies have re-
ceived direct and indirect subsidies for 
decades (cf. Jacobsson/Bergek 2004: 
210). R&D expenditures in these closed 
markets are nevertheless low and in-
novation is slow moving and incre-
mental. R&D expenditures to a very 
large degree depend on the interpreta-
tion of political signals regarding the 
regulation of technology. 
Two trends that challenge the tradi-
tional ways of power generation can 
be observed: the liberalisation of infra-
structures and environmental issues 
such as the “global warming”. Hopes 
that an effective regime to address 
climate change will emerge have 
shifted from the emphasis on a man-
datory multilateral agreement, the 
Kyoto protocol, to a plethora of re-
gional, national, and sub-national pro-
grams and initiatives. Policy responses 
include carbon emission limits and 
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trading systems, direct subsidies for 
renewables, and renewable portfolio 
standards that mandate the use of 
specific volumes of renewable energy 
in electricity generation. Such policy 
initiatives are required because the 
market will not, by itself, respond ade-
quately to the environmental chal-
lenge. Given the rapid growth expected 
in global markets for low-emission 
technologies, the policy agenda is also 
driven by economic development 
goals, as countries vie for competitive-
ness and market share in these emerg-
ing fields. Liberalization can have di-
verging effects on renewable energies. 
If energy prices fall as a result of liber-
alization and increasing market com-
petition (as the pure theory would 
make us expect) the price targets that 
renewables must meet become more 
challenging and liberalization might 
prove to be an impediment for their 
further spread. On the other hand, 
policies and systems such as quotas 
and renewable energy certificates can 
be compatible with more competitive 
market structures as the experiences 
of the last years have shown when 
energy prices increased considerably. 
In fact, many of the policies that have 
been implemented to support renew-
ables operate within the framework of 
liberal markets. (Cf. OECD 2008) 
Finally, beyond the problems of a lack 
of transparency and the prevalence of 
risk-averse actors, there is the con-
straint of centralized energy infrastruc-
tures, which have developed and be-
come established throughout decades. 
National grids are mainly tailored to 
the operation of centralized power 
plants and thus support their exis-
tence. Alternative technologies like 
photovoltaics follow an opposite de-
centralised logic that does not easily fit 
into the established technological con-
cepts. Thus, PV has difficulties compet-
ing with the incumbent technologies 
(cf. Stern 2006: 355). 
In sum this has led to the widely ac-
cepted conviction that policy instru-
ments to create niche markets for re-
newable energies were needed. Even 
the European Commission, tradition-
ally favouring market instruments and 
being quite critical towards demand 
side policy actions, has opted for mar-
ket stimulation programmes for re-
newable energy technologies (cf. 
European Commission 2005; Directive 
2001/77/EC). This is true in spite of the 
fact that until recently the European 
Commission and the OECD both had 
disapproved the German model of 
market stimulation and instead had 
favoured quota models which use 
market signals in order to increase the 
supply of renewable energy (cf. Busch 
2005: 235). 
3 Photovoltaics: Characteristics of 
the technology 
Analysing the photovoltaics success 
story, we need to give a short intro-
duction to the technologies and appli-
cations we are talking about. Photo-
voltaics use solar cells to produce 
electric power1. The most common 
type of solar cell consists of either 
mono-crystalline or poly-crystalline 
silicon, which is conventionally pro-
duced and used in the electronics 
(semiconductor) industry. Crystalline 
silicon technologies represent a 93 % 
share of the photovoltaics world mar-
ket (cf. Solarbuzz 2007). Mono-
crystalline silicon cells are character-
ised by their ability to convert a rela-
tively large section of the light spec-
trum into electricity with an efficiency 
of up to 24,7 per cent under ideal labo-
ratory conditions (cf. Solarserver 
2007). Poly-crystalline silicon cells do 
not achieve such high efficiencies, but 
they compensate it with price-
advantages. The same holds for amor-
phous and other ‘thin film’ technolo-
gies that consist of cadmium telluride 
(CdTe) or copper indium diselenide 
(CIS). Due to silicon shortages for sev-
eral years now, research and develop-
                                                       
1 Photovoltaics should not to be mixed up 
with solar-thermy, which uses solar radia-
tion to produce heat. 
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ment on non-silicon thin film tech-
nologies has become increasingly 
popular and remarkable reductions in 
production costs have been achieved. 
The French physicist Alexandre Bec-
querel first discovered the photovoltaic 
effect in 1839. Albert Einstein’s theo-
retical work on the photovoltaic effect 
won the Nobel Prize in 1921. This il-
lustrates that basic research on photo-
voltaics has been carried out for dec-
ades. But first applications did not 
appear until the 1950s, when Bell 
Laboratories invented the first solar 
cell and the US government started to 
use solar cells for satellites. 
“The satellite market became the first sig-
nificant commercial market and annual 
production rose to about 0,1 MWp per year 
in the late 1960s.” (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002: 
10) 
It is striking that the first satellite pro-
ject using solar power was under US 
Navy management and monitored by 
the Department of Defense. Some au-
thors therefore pointed out that 
photovoltaics was just the case of an-
other technology for which the role of 
the military was crucial in the innova-
tion process (cf. Clark/Juma 1987: 142, 
Jacobsson et al 2002: 10). Due to US 
export restrictions the European Space 
Agency had to rely on German compa-
nies like Siemens and Telefunken to 
get involved in photovoltaics research 
and production for space programs in 
the 1960s (cf. Jacobsson et al 2002: 
16). Since the 1970s and largely owing 
to the oil crises, interest in the devel-
opment of various terrestrial applica-
tions grew and led to further R&D ac-
tivities, mainly in the USA and Japan. A 
range of off-grid applications emerged, 
that were mainly used for consumer 
electronics like calculators and 
watches or as stand-alone ‘power sta-
tions’ for SOS telephones and in re-
mote places like alpine huts and camp-
ing sites. Beyond this the idea of solar 
home systems for developing countries 
came up. Rather distinct from these 
off-grid photovoltaics are newer forms 
of applications that supply electricity 
to the grid just as conventional power 
technologies. Grid-connected applica-
tions can be found as roof-top sys-
tems, ground-mounted systems or as 
systems integrated into house façades. 
However, early projects demonstrating 
how to use photovoltaics in order to 
supply electricity to the grid did not 
appear before the 1990s. Thus grid-
connected photovoltaics is a rather 
new development. It is therefore strik-
ing that since 1999 in IEA (Interna-
tional Energy Agency) reporting coun-
tries grid-connected photovoltaics has 
rapidly outpaced other applications (cf. 
IEA 2005). 
4 Promoting photovoltaics 
In the following we will analyse the 
development of photovoltaics based 
on the hypothesis that an advocacy 
coalition is a crucial mechanism be-
hind the formulation and implementa-
tion of innovation policies. 
“Private firms, state agencies and other 
organisations often act with the objective 
to influence innovation policies in order to 
get them designed and implemented in 
their own interest” (cf. Edquist 2001: 20). 
So called advocacy coalitions support-
ing environmental policies consist of 
administrative and academic environ-
mentalists as well as members of envi-
ronmental social movements who co-
operate with industrial actors, such as 
manufacturers of renewable energy 
technologies (cf. Jänicke 2007: 140). 
But since lobbyism is often a conserva-
tive mechanism, as it requires that the 
lobbyists have an economic power 
position, one would not assume that 
environmentalists were able to form an 
effective advocacy coalition. Interest 
groups, which support emerging tech-
nologies, are normally neither well 
positioned financially nor do they have 
access to powerful political actors. 
Even though the advocacy coalition for 
photovoltaics was not formed by pow-
erful actors and groups, it intelligently 
managed to use external events to gain 
strong social backing for its ideas, 
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which was needed, as it faced powerful 
opposition by the incumbent energy 
producers. 
“Substituting established technologies 
implies, (…), that new interest groups will 
challenge existing ones, and a realignment 
of the institutional framework, and a trans-
formation of the energy system cannot be 
expected to be achieved without overcom-
ing considerable opposition from vested 
interests involved with the incumbent 
technologies.” (Jacobsson et al 2002: 3) 
4.1 The formative stage (1970s – 
1990s) 
The story of PV began like many other 
cases of German research policy. Start-
ing in the early eighties the common 
instruments for the public funding of 
research and development like institu-
tional funding of relevant research 
departments doing basic research were 
used. The external trigger for early 
research had been the oil crisis in the 
1970s. At that time the ministry of re-
search and technology (BMFT) was in 
charge of photovoltaics policy pro-
grams. Initially the support for new 
technology had been integrated into 
the unit for non-nuclear energy tech-
nologies. In 1976, an independent unit 
was created (cf. Ristau 1998: 40). In-
terestingly, many of the programs to 
finance photovoltaics projects, were 
carried out by the ministry of eco-
nomic cooperation and development, 
because during the 1970s the future of 
photovoltaics applications was seen in 
solar home systems for developing 
countries, i.e. the focus was on off-grid 
applications. 
First steps towards an advocacy coali-
tion in the 1980s 
When oil prices had settled down 
again and with the beginning of the 
conservative-liberal coalition under 
Chancellor Kohl, policy actions in or-
der to promote photovoltaics declined 
severely. In 1985 public funding of 
photovoltaics related research and 
development projects did not account 
for more than 53 Mio DM. Albeit insti-
tutional actors involved in research on 
photovoltaics had been established 
and later on, when other external 
events like the Chernobyl accident 
occurred and discussions on environ-
mental problems or on climate change 
appeared, they managed, together with 
environmentalist groups, to set the 
agenda for photovoltaics. When politi-
cal actors put environmental problems 
higher on the political agenda, the 
Green party on the one hand and 
highly motivated researchers on the 
other hand acted as transmission belts 
between external events and political 
and social discourses. 
In the 1980s specialized photovoltaics 
departments and research institutes 
had been created, like the Fraunhofer 
Institut für Solare Energiesysteme in 
Freiburg (in 1982), the Zentrum für 
Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-
Forschung in Stuttgart/Ulm (in 1988) 
or specialized physics departments, for 
example at the Carl von Ossietzky Uni-
versity of Oldenburg. The latter can be 
seen as a typical example of how the 
formation of the photovoltaics advo-
cacy coalition depended on highly 
committed individual actors. They 
were influenced by the experiences 
made by early anti-nuclear power ac-
tivists, who were criticized for their 
lack of reasonable alternatives for en-
ergy provision (cf. Gabler 2007). The 
formation of research groups and de-
partments dedicated to the develop-
ment of alternatives to nuclear power 
became the first strategic step towards 
the formation of an advocacy coalition 
supporting photovoltaics. Further-
more, the creation of specialized de-
partments and institutes attracted en-
vironmentally committed scientists, 
and later local networks consisting of 
environmentalists and researchers 
emerged. A prominent case is Freiburg, 
where the Fraunhofer Institut für So-
lare Energiesysteme merged with a 
vivid environmental scene that posi-
tively influenced network activities and 
enabled local strategies of niche man-
agement (cf. Niewienda 2006). 
Federal innovation policy at that time 
became mainly direct project funding. 
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The main recipients were the Fraun-
hofer Institute for Solar Energy Sys-
tems, the Hahn-Meitner-Institute, the 
Institute for Solar Energy Supply Tech-
niques and two industrial actors, AEG-
Telefunken and Siemens Solar. The 
early photovoltaics programs “(…) 
provided opportunities for universities, 
institutes and firms to search in many 
directions, which was sensible given 
the underlying uncertainties with re-
spect to technologies and markets” (cf. 
Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 262). Research 
funding was not only dedicated to one 
technology. Rather, competing tech-
nologies, such as crystalline silicon 
and thin-film technologies were sup-
ported. And additionally, research and 
development of inverters (to make 
grid-connected applications work) had 
started. 
Interestingly, these research projects 
on the one hand, and the absence of 
market stimulation programs on the 
other hand, led to the weird situation, 
that the big two German companies 
engaged in photovoltaics production 
managed to develop internationally 
competitive products. German re-
search on photovoltaics achieved a 
leading position alongside Japan and 
the United States, but the technologies 
developed could not be sold at home 
due to a lack of domestic demand (cf. 
Ristau 1998: 45). Actually, photovol-
taics technologies developed in Ger-
many were ready for testing. However, 
owing to the characteristics of the en-
ergy sector, coupled with the difficul-
ties of creating private demand and the 
absence of political interest and finan-
cial support it was unlikely that photo-
voltaics could succeed on the German 
market. The supporting advocacy coa-
lition was in its infancy, consisting 
only of highly committed scientists, 
environmental groups (cf Gabler 2007) 
and a first association, the newly 
founded Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Solar (DGS). In these early days the 
advocacy coalition was too weak, par-
ticularly as it had not yet incorporated 
more powerful industrial lobbies. At 
the same time influential lobby groups 
supporting fossil fuels and nuclear 
power worked hard to prevent compe-
tition from renewable energies. They 
joined forces with the ministry of eco-
nomics (cf. Ristau 1998: 46) and heav-
ily relied on old research and devel-
opment contacts and networks within 
the ministry of research (cf. Ristau 
1998: 44). 
But then external events such as the 
nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986 
changed public opinion and attitudes 
towards nuclear power substantially. 
These events opened a window of op-
portunity for a general discussion on a 
transformation of the energy sector. 
Within two years opposition against 
nuclear energy increased from 50% to 
over 70% (cf. Jahn 1992). While prior to 
Chernobyl only the Green party had 
argued against nuclear power, this 
position was now also adopted by the 
Social Democrats, who opted for phas-
ing out nuclear power plants. In addi-
tion to the national antipathy towards 
nuclear energy the influence of a 
growing Green party as well as power-
ful environmental movements have 
clearly to be mentioned. Considering 
all these circumstances, the German 
government – compared to other 
European governments – at a relatively 
early stage felt compelled to support 
research, development as well as diffu-
sion of renewable energy technologies, 
such as photovoltaics. 
Market stimulation in the early 1990s 
Market stimulation programs are tradi-
tionally policy instruments of the min-
istry of economics, but these instru-
ments have not been applied until 
1991. As we have mentioned before, 
the ministry of economics deliberately 
refused to support the photovoltaics 
research and development projects of 
the ministry of research. And since the 
new technology could definitely not be 
economically competitive in Germany, 
it either had to fail, find its markets 
abroad (in Southern regions, as off 
grid applications in the developing 
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world) or get domestic support in 
terms of an artificial niche market. 
Finally in 1991, the situation changed 
when the first feed-in-law was devel-
oped and passed. It described a 
mechanism based on which utilities 
were obliged to remunerate energy of 
renewable sources fed into the grid. 
Producers of renewable electric power 
received 90% of the average revenue 
per kilowatt-hour from the utilities. 
Even though the first feed-in-law was 
sort of a market stimulation program, 
it contained a market mechanism, 
which at the beginning was not seen 
as critical. But with energy prices de-
clining throughout the 1990s (mainly 
due to European deregulation poli-
cies), this policy instrument emerged 
as being too weak to trigger market 
expansion for photovoltaics. 
This first feed-in-law was accompanied 
by the 1000-roofs-program in the early 
1990s, which enabled first experiences 
with grid-connected photovoltaics 
applications and thus can be inter-
preted as a typical instrument of stra-
tegic niche management. This program 
that started in 1991 and ended in 1995 
was a mixture of demonstration and 
market stimulation. It offered soft 
loans for private households, which 
were interested in participating in the 
grid-connected photovoltaics test 
stage. The program was not only ac-
companied by electro-technical and 
physical tests on inverters, cell dura-
tion etc., but also by social research 
which studied customers’ motives and 
social affiliations (cf. Gen-
nenig/Hoffmann 1996). This first niche 
program became crucial for institu-
tional capacity building and symbol-
ized an initial step towards a transfor-
mation of the energy sector. Routines 
and motives of first movers could be 
revealed, and thus enabled the advo-
cacy coalition to improve its diffusion 
strategy, for example by better taking 
into account special needs of potential 
users. In addition, the program helped 
photovoltaics to gain more public 
awareness. Backed by the feed-in-law, 
which obliged utilities to remunerate 
energy of renewable sources fed into 
the grid, the improvement of inverters 
laid the grounds for structural changes 
within the energy sector, abandoning 
traditional centralised grid systems, 
giving way to decentralised, environ-
mental friendly systems, such as grid 
connected photovoltaics applications. 
When the 1000-roofs-program ended 
and the German government did not 
immediately develop follow-up pro-
grams, “(…) one could observe a shift 
in the investment activities of the big 
European PV-companies from Europe 
towards the US” (Jäger-Waldau 2002: 
40). The ministry of economics (BMWi) 
started a market launch program for 
renewable energy technologies in 
1995. But since this program only pro-
vided 4.5 Mio. DM for photovoltaics, it 
did not meet the expectations of the 
photovoltaics industry (cf. Ristau 
1998). This is a striking example for 
the relationship between uncertainty 
and innovation. Throughout the 1990s 
the German policy did not systemati-
cally target at uncertainty. Its pro-
grams were inadequately financed and 
not based on long-term considera-
tions. As a result the development of 
technical innovations and marketable 
products came to a halt.  This only 
changed, when the Green party to-
gether with the Social Democrats came 
into power in 1998. 
Despite these shortcomings, it has to 
be admitted, that the 1990s can be 
characterised by early (successful) in-
vestments. Public funded R&D, as well 
as the first market stimulation pro-
grams and the first feed-in law did not 
only lead to the build-up of an initial 
knowledge base. It also enabled the 
creation of an embryonic advocacy 
coalition consisting of scientists, an 
infant industry and its interest organi-
sations, as well as highly committed 
environmentalists. Some of them ap-
peared as first movers on the market, 
which means they were the first cos-
tumers participating in the 1000-roof 
program. Even though the programme 
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offered soft loans, and the power pro-
duced was remunerated, these first 
users did not benefit from their in-
vestment in a monetary sense. Instead 
they appeared as ‘the hard core’ of the 
advocacy coalition, mainly acting out 
of ideological reasons. But the early 
investments and the ideological com-
mitments triggered positive feedbacks, 
which for example resulted in the abil-
ity of the coalition to shape further 
institutional change and to initiate 
sectoral transformation. Taken to-
gether the first political programs had 
significant effects. First of all public 
awareness of the new technology rose 
and photovoltaics was provided with 
legitimacy. Public and social accep-
tance as well as political support of the 
technology was achieved, subsidies 
became widely approved. Furthermore, 
a number of new, often small firms 
entered the market, “(…) among these, 
we find both module manufacturers 
and integrators of solar cells into fa-
cades and roofs, the latter moving the 
market for solar cells into new applica-
tions” (Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 266). 
Prior to this, the two big players, Sie-
mens and AEG Telefunken dominated 
the market. Just to give an idea: in 
1991, when the 1000-roofs-program 
was launched, 99.5% of the induced 
market demand was satisfied by these 
two companies. And even in 1993 
when the program was opened for 
European competitors like BP-Solar 
and the Italian firm Helios, Siemens 
and ASE still held a 70% market share 
(cf. Ristau 1998: 48). 
Strategic niche management in the 
1990s 
Throughout the 1990s, industrial (so-
lar) associations were gradually 
founded, which aimed to improve and 
enhance political support of the infant 
technology and its commercialization. 
Additionally, (local) groups and socie-
ties, like the Aachen Solarverein, Euro-
solar and Förderverein Solarenergie 
were founded and discussed the suit-
ability of political instruments. They 
developed blue prints for a new feed-
in-law or another roof-program and 
tried to build up political momentum. 
Local politicians, who strongly fa-
voured the idea of renewable energies 
and opted for more decentralised en-
ergy systems, joined them. To them, 
grid-connected photovoltaics applica-
tions met both of these aims. It was a 
coalition of local politicians, the Green 
party, researchers, environmental so-
cieties and business associations that 
managed to influence the federal gov-
ernment to improve and enhance its 
innovation policy for photovoltaics. 
Especially when the 1000-roofs-
program ended, strategic niche man-
agement appeared on the local level: 
protagonists of the solar scene were 
successful in implementing local feed-
in-laws, inspired by the Aachen So-
larverein. In contrast to the federal 
law, which only regulated the remu-
neration of photovoltaics power at 
arm’s length, the concept of the 
Aachen Solarverein provided cost-
covering prices. The development of a 
policy instrument that aims to con-
vince users purchasing PV for return 
on investment reasons can be inter-
preted as a change in secondary as-
pects. Still adhering to its policy core, 
the PV coalition has learned new ways 
to achieve its goal. Thus the new 
mechanism provided an opportunity 
for the wider diffusion of photovoltaics 
in a way that was not only attractive to 
ideological environmentalists as po-
tential users, but photovoltaics became 
also an interesting option for non-
ideological customers (beyond the 
initial advocacy coalition) to earn 
money. 
These initiatives were strongly sup-
ported by the infant photovoltaics in-
dustry and its associations. The solar 
industry intensified its lobbying, and in 
particular due to some of the global 
players that were also involved in cell 
production, like Siemens and ASE be-
coming part of the advocacy coalition, 
political pressure began to become 
more effective. Siemens, which was 
already producing in the USA, com-
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plained, that due to the lack of domes-
tic demand in Germany, it would not 
make sense, coming back to Germany, 
and ASE threatened to follow Siemens 
if no follow up program would be 
started. In reaction the federal gov-
ernment started a debate on the 
100.000-roofs-program. This long-
term-perspective for public funding i.e. 
creating a niche market was the rea-
son for ASE to stay in Germany and 
even build up new production plants. 
It increased its capacity from 20 to 50 
MW by the end of 2002 under the 
name of RWE-Schott Solar (cf. 
Jacobsson/Lauber 2006:268). 
In the PV coalition’s formative stage 
significant opposition arose. Industrial 
organizations, especially German utili-
ties strongly opposed political instru-
ments to support photovoltaics, such 
as the early energy-feed-in-law from 
1991 (cf. Wong 2005: 135). In 1994 
Preussen Elektra lodged a complaint 
against this law at the European and 
the German federal level. Opposition 
was not only voiced as a general cri-
tique of subsidizing renewable energy 
technologies, but it was also targeted 
at the specific design of the feed-in 
law, which indeed disadvantaged some 
of the utilities. Since renewable energy 
is mainly produced in the windy re-
gions nearby the coast (wind power) 
and photovoltaics applications are 
concentrated in the sunny South, the 
bias led to the situation, that some of 
the Northern utilities or their custom-
ers respectively, had to finance subsi-
dies for renewable energy technolo-
gies. The case was dismissed, but the 
discussion did not stop. 
4.2 Take-off (1998 - 2007) 
Following Sabatier’s argument, policy 
change can only be achieved acommo-
dating external perturbations, such as 
changes in the government coalition or 
impacts from other subsystems. This 
seems also to be true for the case of 
PV. When in 1998 the Green party, to-
gether with the Social Democrats 
formed the federal government, the 
photovoltaics advocacy coalition took 
its chance. Rather than trying to have 
an impact on energy policy from out-
side it now could directly influence the 
rebuilding of institutional frames and 
policy programs. The Greens took over 
the ministry of the environment and 
this initiated the institutionalization of 
the photovoltaics advocacy coalition 
within the centre of political power. 
The situation in the late 1990s was 
accompanied by international and 
European trends, such as the liberali-
zation and deregulation of the energy 
sector and an increased focus of inter-
national institutions as well as the 
European Commission on CO2 reduc-
tion as a political target with top prior-
ity, initiated by the Kyoto protocol. 
As a consequence of the change in 
political power constellations a re-
structuring of the energy sector began. 
Institutional settings and the infra-
structure of the energy sector became 
more open and fluent. Corporate 
structures were being reorganised and 
replaced by more competitive man-
agement and governance structures. 
Thus innovation in photovoltaics was 
accompanied by the re-structuring of 
the energy sector and social innova-
tions like new management concepts, 
new user routines, “new roles and 
identities of electricity customers, new 
policy problems, regulatory concepts, 
institutions and governance arrange-
ments” (cf. Voß et al. 2003: 4). These 
transformation processes have been 
crucial factors to trigger innovation in 
photovoltaics because they opened the 
window of opportunity for the success 
of an advocacy coalition against the 
resistance of the powerful advocates of 
incumbent energy sources. 
The stabilisation of the advocacy coali-
tion 
Two policy instruments were designed 
and implemented, which are widely 
appreciated as having been decisive for 
the German photovoltaics success 
story. The actual design of the instru-
ments has been prepared and debated 
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by solar groups, societies and associa-
tions. Groups like Eurosolar, 
Förderverein Solarenergie and Green-
peace were extremely important for an 
adjusted ‘relaunch’ of the former 1000-
roofs-program. 
In 1999 the program, which aimed at a 
market stimulation, was launched. It 
offered soft loans with 10 years dura-
tion and the redemption starting in the 
third year. In 2000 the Renewable En-
ergy Law was passed. It set a feed-in 
tariff of around 50 Cent2 per kWh fixed 
for 20 years, with a 5% decrease annu-
ally for later installations from 2002 
on. Compared to the first feed-in-law, 
which had been heavily opposed by the 
utilities, the additional costs of renew-
able energies were now shared and 
only five per cent of the financial 
charges had to be paid by the utilities. 
The law was inspired by the local feed-
in laws for solar power as the learning 
effects which had been achieved on 
the local level helped the Greens to 
move the concept to the federal level. 
For this process it was extremely help-
ful that one of the main protagonists 
of the local groups, which had organ-
ized local feed-in tariffs, was elected as 
a federal deputy in 1998 and thus 
could bring in experiences he had 
made on the local level (cf. Rosenbaum 
et al 2005: 79). He was among the 
Green deputies, who initiated a discur-
sive process involving various actors, 
such as environmental groups, solar 
industry associations, the association 
of the machinery and equipment pro-
ducers VDMA, the metalworkers trade 
union, solar cell producers and politi-
cians from some Länder. This institu-
tionalization of an intermediate level 
of conflict can be interpreted referring 
to Sabatier’s concept of policy learn-
ing. The panel did not intend to con-
duct a general discussion on the future 
of the German energy system (the pol-
                                                       
2 The exact amount is subject to size and 
application: electricity from rooftop sys-
tems is reimbursed higher than electricity 
sourced from ground-mounted systems. 
icy core, still separating the coalitions), 
instead it only discussed the issue of 
financial support for renewable energy 
technologies. Hence, in 1998 the Green 
party acted as a policy broker, search-
ing for compromises in secondary as-
pects that could be supported by the 
majority of actors. This facilitated the 
enlargement and stabilization of the 
advocacy coalition in a way that guar-
anteed its survival even without insti-
tutional backing in the future. 
“The unorthodox coalition even included a 
major utility (…); as a result the big utilities 
were not united in their opposition.” 
(Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 267) 
Besides innovation in PV was still sup-
ported by public research money – 
albeit in a decreasing manner. Public 
money became concentrated on net-
work and cluster projects, many of 
them part of structural policies in or-
der to help the economically underde-
veloped regions in the East of Ger-
many. Regional cluster and network 
policy is a rather new policy instru-
ment that aims to create an innovation 
friendly environment by fostering col-
lective identities and trust to support 
the formation and elaboration of local 
networks (cf. Dohse 2007). Within the 
last years, the solar industry has well 
understood where to settle down in 
order to receive subsidies. Several 
photovoltaics clusters have been es-
tablished in East Germany especially in 
the small town of Thalheim nearby 
Bitterfeld in Saxony-Anhalt. Particu-
larly small start-ups, which emerged 
after 2000, have settled down in the 
Eastern regions. One of the world 
leaders in cell production became Q-
Cells, a firm, founded in Berlin in 1999, 
which soon moved to Thalheim in or-
der to start cell production in 2001. Q-
Cells is one example of Germany’s 
success story. It perfectly reflects the 
effectiveness of the 100.000-roofs-
program and the Renewable Energy 
Law. At the end of 2002 Q-Cells em-
ployed 82 persons, at the end of 2004 
it already had 484 employees, a num-
ber which has grown to 1.700 at the 
end of 2007. 
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Q-Cells also can serve as an example 
on how the photovoltaics industry is 
now increasingly able to get financing 
and venture capital from the private 
sector and the equity market. Since 
October 2005 Q-Cells is listed on the 
Frankfurt stock exchange, and since 
December 2005 it is included in the 
technology index TecDax of the Ger-
man stock exchange. This shows that 
the industry has left the formative 
stage, i.e. the niche market and has 
been entering the take off stage – 
ready for market expansion. 
Market expansion and growing public 
acceptance 
The take-off stage is characterized by a 
significant enlargement and diversifi-
cation of the photovoltaics advocacy 
coalition. This applies to producers as 
well as to users. Whereas first produc-
ers like the Freiburg Solar-Fabrik, 
founded in 1996 by the environmental-
ist Georg Salvamoser, were embedded 
in local solar networks and were not 
solely led by return on investment 
thinking, motives and behaviours of 
producers like Q-Cells do not differ 
from producers in other sectors. Addi-
tionally, due to the Renewable Energy 
Law, users of photovoltaics are not 
any longer necessarily led by ‘green’ 
motives, as it has increasingly become 
profitable to purchase solar modules, 
especially for farmers, who have plenty 
of space on their barn roofs, which can 
be used as building ground for the 
rather cheap thin film technology (cf. 
Rosenbaum et al 2005: 85f.).3 Fur-
thermore, this development is accom-
panied by the wide acceptance of solar 
energy within the German public. This 
trend is vividly reflected in the Chris-
tian Democratic party, which now has 
well accepted the strategy of creating a 
                                                       
                                                      
3 The literature on strategic niche man-
agement sees the prevalence of economic 
motives as an impediment to the success of 
policies (Hoogma et al. 2002). We are argu-
ing that exactly the opposite mechanism 
(addressing economic motives) has been 
essential for the success of PV policies.   
niche market for photovoltaics. Thus, 
when in 2005 the Red-Green govern-
ment ended and was replaced by the 
grand coalition of Social Democrats 
and Christian Democrats, the new 
government did not opt for striking a 
new path. The Renewable Energy Law 
was not abolished and it is save to say, 
that the amendment of the law does 
not entail comprehensive changes for 
PV support. 
The take-off stage has also been ac-
companied by organizational changes, 
which helped to consolidate the cho-
sen path. In 2002, after the re-election 
of the Red-Green government, the coa-
lition parties agreed that the ministry 
of the environment should obtain full 
responsibility for renewable energies. 
Whereas the beginning of the forma-
tive stage had been characterised by 
conflicts of competences between the 
ministry of economics and the ministry 
of research, and both being rather 
averse to substantially supporting 
photovoltaics, in 2002 the situation 
completely changed. The ministry of 
the environment is now responsible 
for the Renewable Energy Law as well 
as the public financing of photovol-
taics related R&D.4 
Meanwhile the photovoltaics industry 
in Germany is highly differentiated, as 
concerns the command of competing 
technologies and in the capability to 
set up important links to surrounding 
industries. Therefore photovoltaics 
related R&D is not just research on 
new materials and cell efficiencies. An 
increasing number of projects is 
funded which carry out research on 
inverters. This also holds true for the 
firms, which produce the technology. 
 
4 Other elements of institutionalization are 
the so-called ‘Glottertal talks’, which are 
strategic talks on photovoltaics related 
R&D. These talks originated in 1987, but 
have gained importance particularly during 
the last couple of years. Researchers and 
representatives of the leading institutes 
and companies meet with members of the 
ministry of the environment in order to 
discuss future public R&D activities for PV. 
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„For instance, in 2000, there were ten firms 
showing roof integrated solar cells at an 
exhibition (…) and Germany is seen as the 
world leader in roof integrated solar cells.” 
(Jacobsson/Lauber 2006: 268) 
Especially the German machine build-
ing industry has benefited from the 
emergence of photovoltaics. Likewise 
German solar producers took advan-
tage of the expertise of the machine 
building industry, since, as mentioned 
above, many innovations in photovol-
taics are geared to cost reductions in 
the production processes. 
Architects and craftsmen, especially 
electricians have well adapted to the 
new technology as a growth option for 
their businesses and surrounding in-
stitutions of vocational education 
managed to adjust their curricula. 
Thus well-known bottle-necks that 
often constrain the diffusion of new 
technologies have been overcome. 
A new coalition 
The specific dynamic of the advocacy 
coalition can be revealed if we look at 
the machine building industry. This 
industry, which cannot be considered 
to be part of the original energy policy 
subsystem proper, is strongly support-
ing the PV coalition. In its early forma-
tive stage the coalition exclusively fo-
cused on promoting renewable energy 
technologies. It shared a joint policy 
core, which aimed at the transforma-
tion of the energy sector through sub-
stituting nuclear and fossil power 
plants for renewable energy technolo-
gies. Ensuing learning processes 
helped to develop new policy instru-
ments. Former radical opposition 
against the traditional energy sector, 
based on theories and visions high-
lighting worst case scenarios on the 
one hand and demonstrations and 
blockade actions on the other hand, 
gave way to more pragmatic consid-
erations and helped the coalition to 
gain political power. The new PV policy 
core is now characterised not as pure 
opposition, but as supporting PV. Its 
formation has been accompanied by 
new theories, visions and ideas on 
generating demand for PV by reducing 
costs, increasing returns, spreading 
information and eventually on finding 
ways to enlarge the coalition.  As a 
result the machine building industry 
could be integrated into the coalition. 
Even some utilities, which either do 
not belong to the policy subsystem or 
explicitly share another policy core 
became affiliated to the coalition. 
Thus, the policy changes towards a 
concentration on positive support of 
PV prepared the ground for the inte-
 
Figure 1: PV power installed in Germany (MWp) 
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gration of a heterogeneous set of al-
lies. 
4.3 Success Indicators 
The success story can be further illus-
trated by providing some quantitative 
indicators. In order to measure ‘suc-
cess’ we will use the indicators ‘in-
stalled PV power’, ‘production’, 'export 
sales’, ‘employees’ and ‘patents’. 
As figure 1 impressively shows, in-
stalled PV power was on a relatively 
low level, then doubled for the first 
time in 2000 and has grown continu-
ously since then. These findings dem-
onstrate the correlation between policy 
instruments that were applied by the 
federal Red-Green coalition govern-
ment, the regulatory legal instruments 
supporting PV, and the expansion of 
the market. 
In 2005 “(…) Germany accounted for 
more than 93% of the EU 25” (Jäger-
Waldau 2006: 75) installations. Stable 
political and socio-economical condi-
tions do not only convince private 
households to install photovoltaic 
power installations, but solid markets 
also stimulate the investment in new 
production capacities for solar cells 
and modules. 
As can be seen from figure 2, cell pro-
duction now amounts to more than 
500 MW annually. Sales as well as ex-
port shipments of the German photo-
voltaics industry have been rising at a 
comparable rate, as it is shown in fig-
ure 3 and 4. 
Sales figures and numbers of photo-
voltaics power installed can show the 
market success of photovoltaics. But 
even more common to measure inno-
vation are patent data, since “(…) pat-
ents provide a uniquely detailed source 
of information on inventive activity” 
(cf. OECD 1994: 9). As figure 5 shows, 
Japan is far ahead in patent applica-
tions, followed by the USA and Ger-
many.5 German patent activities well 
 
                                                                 
5 It is striking that Japan accounts for 74% 
of all patent applications, but this is mainly 
reflect the global increase of photovol-
taics patents from around 500 in the 
early 1990s up to around 2000 in 2002. 
The numbers for Germany are not 
much different from those of the USA, 
and Germany is far ahead of other in-
dustrialized countries, such as its 
European neighbours. Rather than 
being a precondition for the further 
development of PV the data seem to 
suggest that the economic success of 
PV spurred hectic activities to protect 
intellectual property. 
Altogether these figures clearly prove 
the (at least short term) success of the 
PV industry. It is expanding production 
in Germany and off shore, it is increas-
ing the export ratio of its production, it 
is employing ever more people, it is 
working profitable and it accumulates 
intellectual capital. Meanwhile more 
companies are active in this sector and 
more people working there than in 
many established economic sectors. 
5 A future for photovoltaics? 
In the beginning we claimed that the 
creation of niche markets can be a 
successful policy instrument in coordi-
nated market economies (hypothesis 
1), if a powerful advocacy coalition can 
be mobilised (hypothesis 2). 
Our analysis has shown that the sup-
port of PV after 1998 has proved to be 
successful in establishing a growing, 
profitable economic activity. The PV 
industry can produce and sell its prod-
ucts both in Germany and abroad. The 
story, however, has also proved that 
the success of such a policy depends 
on many favourable circumstances. It 
does not only need broad political and
 
due to characteristics of the Japanese pat-
ent law system, which makes the process 
of applying for a patent easier and cheaper 
than in the USA and Germany. Further-
more, in Japan normally one invention is 
divided into small elements and for each a 
patent application is filed (cf. Siemer 2005: 
66). Therefore comparing German patent 
activities with the Japanese would be bias-
ing. 
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Figure 2: Solar cell production in Germany (Mw) 
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Figure 3: Sales of the German photovoltaics industry (Mio. Euro) 
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Figure 4: Export sales of the German photovoltaics industry (Mio. Euro) 
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public support that goes beyond the 
initial rather limited policy core, but 
also a delicate architecture of instru-
ments that are geared towards the 
special characteristics of the system to 
be supported. The policy instruments 
are mostly not generic, but geared 
towards the specific problems of the 
PV industry. 
The success of PV is also linked to 
frame conditions, offering a window of 
opportunity for change. The electric 
power sector faced new challenges 
over the last years. These challenges 
originated in a move to liberalize mar-
kets, the expectation that the sector 
should contribute to environmental 
aims and the development of new 
technologies (e.g. renewable energies) 
each of them apparently hard to cope 
with by the dominant regime of the 
sector. PV as an innovative decentral-
ized small technology, which could be 
connected to the grid without severe 
difficulties and compatibility problems 
successfully, exploited the emerging 
opportunity. PV could rely on existing 
scientific knowledge in this area and 
the expertise of suppliers (e.g. machine 
building industry). 
The political instruments developed 
offered long term security for the in-
dustry as well as incentives to build 
new production units in the disadvan-
taged regions of the new German 
Länder. The users of PV-modules were 
guaranteed a 20-year security on their 
investments. Insofar PV could serve 
many masters. The present strength of 
the coalition has only recently been 
proved when the federal government 
amended the Renewable Energy Law 
without implementing important 
changes. It achieved nearly unanimous 
support by a public in favour of clean 
technologies, and it was supported by 
an advocacy coalition comprising sci-
entists, politicians, environmentalists 
and increasingly economic actors. 
 
Figure 5: Global patent applications in photovoltaics 
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Taken together the many beneficial 
factors and the very specific composi-
tion of the advocacy coalition also 
point to the difficulties to imitate this 
successful experiment in other areas. 
The lesson cannot be that the same 
policy should be and can be pursued in 
other cases as well. Rather, the general 
lesson learned is that customized in-
novation policies need to reflect the 
specific conditions and opportunities 
in the targeted areas. 
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Abstract 
Financial markets are complex: Factors that affect their development and the asso-
ciations between these factors are not clearly assignable. Nevertheless, every day 
thousands of investors face the task of mastering the complexity of the markets. 
How do they solve this problem in their daily practice? This paper discusses this 
question by investigating a special area of the capital markets, namely, portfolio 
management. Two possible methods of handling the complexity of financial mar-
kets are presented: first, the qualitative methods (heuristics), and second, the for-
mal (mostly computer-assisted) models. The central finding of the paper is the high 
heterogeneity of the applied methods. There are free spaces that portfolio manag-
ers can use while framing complex market situations. It could be suggested that 
this diversity contributes to the emergence and self-preservation of the market 
complexity. This contribution is dedicated to the empirical argument for these 
mechanisms. 
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1 Introduction: Financial Markets 
Complexity 
This article discusses the phenomenon 
complexity as applied to the case of 
financial markets. Financial markets 
are often used as an example to illus-
trate the assertion that the complexity 
of modern society increased dramati-
cally over last decades. The term com-
plexity is thereby applied as a synonym 
for uncertainty, lack of control, or lack 
of transparency. But what exactly is 
complexity and in what sense are fi-
nancial markets complex? 
Weyer (2009) suggests dividing the 
existing complexity theories into two 
groups: Some theories define complex-
ity as an objective structural phe-
nomenon at the macro level; others 
conceptualize it as a subjective con-
struct. He also points to the fact that 
theories refer to two dimensions of 
complexity: quantitative and qualita-
tive. 
At the macro level, the quantitative 
dimension would mean that the com-
plex phenomenon consists of too 
many components, with too many re-
lations between them; the qualitative 
dimension indicates that specific inter-
actions between components lead to 
unpredictable dynamics. Applied to 
financial markets, this classification 
would suggest that financial markets 
are complex because their behavior is 
determined by several factors that do 
not show clear associations. It could 
be easily demonstrated if one suggests 
that financial market behavior is re-
flected in asset prices. Asset prices and 
their trends depend on a large number 
of factors, whose influence can never 
be estimated with certainty. In the case 
of equities, for example, prices depend 
on the future stream of payments pro-
duced by the company, such as earn-
ings and dividends. They are affected 
by the so-called fundamental factors, 
e.g., profit situation, product range, 
market position, and management 
quality. There are also other factors, 
such as the macroeconomic conditions 
(interest rates, inflation, currency de-
velopments, etc.), political expecta-
tions (tax policies, state subsidies, po-
litical stability, etc.), as well as the psy-
chology of the market players (their 
expectations, risk preferences, etc.). It 
is not just impossible to specify all 
variables; rather, it must always be 
anticipated that new factors are added, 
such as new products, take-over ru-
mors, etc.1 A good example is the un-
expected insolvency of a local bank in 
California in February 2007. The unex-
pected event led to a strong market 
correction. This example also suggests 
that small events can have a big influ-
ence at the macro level. In general, 
complex systems are characterized by 
non-linearity. This means that causes 
and effects are not proportional; there 
are back couplings and interdepend-
encies that lead to emergence of un-
predictable and chaotic2 structures 
(Mainzer 2008, Richter/Rost 2004). 
It is important to point out that finan-
cial markets’ non-linearity and com-
plexity are “man-made”. The develop-
ments of the securities’ prices depend 
on the behavior of several actors and 
their interaction in the market: inves-
tors, analysts, brokers, companies’ 
executives, and investor relations, to 
name a few. The participation of dif-
ferent groups and individuals increases 
the complexity of the system. Those 
groups and persons are carriers of 
individual expectations and experi-
ences that must be taken into consid-
eration along with the investors’ own 
expectations. Every player is observed 
in his or her decision making, while at 
the same time he is an observer him-
                                                       
1 This problem was analyzed by Nassim N. 
Taleb (2007) in his book “The Black Swan: 
The Impact of the Highly Improbable.” He 
called the unexpected factors, that influ-
ence securities prices significantly, the 
black swans. 
2 This is the reason why chaos theory is 
now extensively applied to analyze finan-
cial markets. See Trippi (1994) for an over-
view. 
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self.3 In the case of financial markets, 
Brian Arthur (1995: 3) described this 
problem as follows: “Where forming 
expectations means predicting an ag-
gregate outcome that is formed in part 
from others’ expectations, expectation 
formation can become self-
referential.” This self-referentiality of 
expectations, which determine invest-
ment prices, is one of the most signifi-
cant factors that cause complexity of 
the financial markets. 
In the social world, the intentional 
acting at the level of the individual 
participants often leads to the “condi-
tions that are essentially the by-
products” (Elster 1987: 141). The com-
plex behavior of financial markets is 
not deducible from the actions of the 
individual players and is such a by-
product. This is why complexity is an 
immanent feature of financial markets. 
However, if we follow the Weyer’s 
classification of complexity theories, 
the second group of those theories 
should be mentioned. Representatives 
of this group (Malik 2002; Schimank 
2005) consider complexity as a feature 
of subjective decision situations. Indi-
viduals are limited in their knowledge 
as well as in their cognitive capacity to 
process huge volumes of information 
and to establish causal links between 
many factors. For example, the market 
correction due to the insolvency of the 
Californian bank could not be foreseen 
by most of the market players, since 
they had not been aware of the exis-
tence of this bank and therefore could 
not attribute to the event the signifi-
cance which in the end was attributed 
to it by the market. 
According to Weyer, sociological the-
ory of complexity should consider the 
entanglement of structural and cogni-
                                                       
3 The players are aware of this fact: they 
include observations and expectations of 
outside observers into their own hypothe-
sis and expectations. This increases the 
complexity even further: Luhmann (2002: 
181) suggested using the term hyper-
complexity for this phenomenon. 
tive factors. In the case of socio-
technical systems like aircrafts, for 
example, it is dissatisfactory to restrict 
the analysis to the question of how 
individual cognitive acts are con-
structed. It is important to reconstruct 
the design of the system and the room 
for maneuvering within it (see also 
Grote 2005). 
In this article, I would like to elaborate 
on the link between the structural and 
cognitive factors of complexity in the 
case of financial markets. I will refer to 
the structure or design of the markets 
as the market frame and analyze the 
room for maneuvering that individual 
investors have within those market 
frames. Based on empirical research, it 
can be shown that such room is quite 
significant. This finding suggests that, 
though market frames are socially em-
bedded and shared, there are individ-
ual ways to reduce complexity within 
those frames. In other words, com-
plexity reduction at the micro level is 
itself complex and contributes to the 
complexity emergence at the macro 
level. 
Those topics will be approached in the 
article from an empirical perspective: 
Daily practices of portfolio managers 
as a specific group of financial market 
participants will be analyzed. In sec-
tion 2, the concept of market frame 
will be discussed. In section 3, the 
distinctive characteristics of portfolio 
managers will be described. The cen-
tral question will thus be examining 
exactly how this group of investors is 
exposed to the problem of complexity. 
In section 4, data samples will be pre-
sented. Afterwards, two specific ways 
of dealing with complexity within the 
field of portfolio management will be 
outlined: forming heuristics and the 
use of quantitative models. At the con-
clusion, all findings will be discussed. 
2 Market frames 
Social studies of finance have been 
busy in the last years investigating 
how different groups of financial mar-
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ket participants handle the markets’ 
complexity, i.e., how they decide, if 
there are no “if - then” rules, and if no 
clear effect can be assigned to any of 
the factors. According to those studies, 
there are frames that help to reduce 
complexity while they “reduce the 
amount of possible worlds…, that is, 
reduce contingency” (Arnoldi 2006: 
385). Frames limit decision possibili-
ties, focus and structure the informa-
tion, and help to interpret market 
events while they define boundaries 
for perception, meaning, and commu-
nication. Complexity is reduced 
through framing because a structure of 
possible “if-then” rules emerges. 
As an answer to the question “Who 
constructs the market frame?” Har-
die/MacKenzie (2007) suggest the con-
cept of the “distributed framing”: “By 
this we mean the involvement of mul-
tiple market actors in the process of 
sifting data and constructing ways of 
interpreting it” (Hardie/MacKenzie 
2007: 391). This means that frames are 
formed not entirely individually but in 
the permanent interaction with other 
market participants. There are, for 
example, analysts, brokers, and inves-
tors. They develop practices with 
shared rules, codes, and networks that 
form frames (Knorr Cetina/Bruegger 
2000). It should be added that the state 
also participates in framing processes 
by means of legal regulations. Institu-
tional and organizational design is 
also important. An investor who is a 
member of a big investment bank has 
a frame that differs from the frame of a 
private investor, for example. The first 
one has the opportunity to receive 
support services from analysts and 
brokers or to talk to companies’ man-
agement because he is an official 
member of an investment bank. There 
is also an official funding provided to 
conduct business trips to visit coun-
tries and companies, which means that 
there is the opportunity to talk to in-
vestor relations, companies’ CEOs, as 
well as to state representatives. In 
other words, access is provided to spe-
cial sources of information and thus 
framing possibilities that are inacces-
sible for private investors. There are 
also internal rules and rituals within 
organizations that shape market 
frames of investors (for example, dif-
ferent official meetings). 
It should be also taken into considera-
tion that investment banks employ 
people who enjoyed similar education 
at universities or business schools. 
Institutions also support a specific, 
business-related training of employ-
ees. This leads to the fact that em-
ployed investors share basically the 
same theoretical frames. 
Extensive research has also been con-
ducted on the topic of how diffusion of 
technology and financial formulae 
influence framing devices of the mar-
ket participants (Callon 1998, 
MacKenzie 2001, 2006). In investment 
institutions, high-power computers as 
well as specific technical equipment 
like Bloomberg and Reuters are avail-
able (in addition to the telephone and 
internet). 
Social studies of finance demonstrate 
that there are indeed multiple market 
actors (brokers, analysts, companies’ 
management, investment organiza-
tions, the state, etc.) who participate in 
the distributed framing. Therefore, 
social, institutional, and technological 
conditions are considered to be 
equally important for framing proc-
esses in all types of financial markets: 
in the foreign exchange market, in the 
derivatives market, and in the capital 
market. Studies point to differences 
between the groups of institutional 
market participants: derivatives traders 
(Zaloom 2003, Arnoldi 2006), foreign 
exchange traders (Knorr Cet-
ina/Bruegger 2000), bond traders (Abo-
lafia 1996), arbitrage traders (Be-
unza/Stark 2004), as well as securities 
analysts (Beunza/Garud 2004, Lan-
genohl/Schmidt-Beck 2007). At the 
same time, they concentrate on simi-
larities of framing devices within those 
groups. 
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But if everybody within a particular 
investors’ category is subject to similar 
constraints and uses the same tech-
nology and formulae, one should ask, 
as do Beunza/Stark (2004), “How can 
an investor recognize an opportunity?” 
and “How can he or she profit?”. Re-
lating to our topic, we should ask how 
complexity could be explained in par-
ticular financial markets if participants 
share the frames, i.e., reduce complex-
ity in the same way. In this context, it 
is important to remember that the 
standard financial theory that assumes 
identical investors has difficulties ex-
plaining the complex paths financial 
markets develop, such as bubbles and 
crashes. How do chaotic structures 
emerge within different financial mar-
kets if actors use homogenous frames 
to reduce complexity? 
The concept of the frame is not suffi-
cient to answer those questions. The 
focus should be shifted to the room for 
maneuvering that exists within the 
frames. The paper at hand discusses 
the availability and the structure of 
that flexibility in the case of one addi-
tional group of investor professionals 
that has not previously been the ex-
plicit focus of social studies: portfolio 
managers. Their methods of dealing 
with complexity will be discussed. It 
will be demonstrated that although 
portfolio managers share certain social 
practices, use similar technologies, 
and are subject to organizational and 
institutional constraints, there is still 
flexibility within those frames. The 
suggestion of this paper is to take a 
closer look at flexibility within the 
frames. The hypothesis is that financial 
market participants exploit those free 
spaces in various ways. This means 
that complexity reduction through 
framing does not happen uniformly at 
the micro level. In turn, it is supposed 
that while portfolio managers exploit 
free spaces within their frames, they 
form diverse expectations and make 
different decisions. This heterogeneity 
of expectations and decisions as a re-
sult of complexity reduction contrib-
utes to the increase of complexity in 
the market. This other side of the coin 
– an emergence of complexity, not only 
its reduction – might also be of interest 
for social studies of finance. Complex-
ity is not a given fact that the market 
participants find in the market and 
deal with. Complexity is generated 
while the market participants handle it 
in different ways within their frames. 
3 Portfolio management 
Portfolio managers are financial mar-
ket professionals who invest the mon-
ey of their clients in different assets, 
such as equities, bonds, derivatives 
and other financial instruments, in 
order to earn the maximum return for 
a given risk profile. If the money is 
provided by an individual client, a 
portfolio manager assesses the client’s 
individual needs and exercises alloca-
tion of funds among assets and par-
ticular securities, meaning that the 
money is not invested in a single stock 
or bond but in a group of financial 
instruments, which is called portfolio. 
A portfolio is a diversified mix of secu-
rities. If the money of many investors 
is pooled in a portfolio, such a portfo-
lio is called a mutual fund. In all cases, 
the task of a portfolio manager is to 
decide which and how many securities 
to buy, as well as to watch and to ad-
just the portfolio over the course of 
time. 
The process of portfolio construction 
and adjustment is subject not only to 
clients’ specifications but also to vari-
ous legal, organizational and institu-
tional constraints. First of all, there are 
laws that regulate how portfolios can 
be structured. For example, laws dic-
tate in which securities a portfolio 
manager can invest at all, how to as-
sure a proper level of diversification in 
order to protect investors (for example, 
which percentage of the fund assets is 
allowed to be invested in a single secu-
rity), and so on. Portfolio managers are 
usually employees of investment com-
panies. Investment companies specify 
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the investment products and the in-
vestment processes (investment goals, 
asset classes, reporting period, in-
vestment styles, etc.) as well as define 
how funds’ performances will be 
measured and controlled. For example, 
if a portfolio manager is responsible 
for an Emerging Markets Equity Fund, 
he is allowed to invest only in the eq-
uities of particular emerging countries 
and has to follow a predefined invest-
ment process. Therefore, institutions 
further narrow the operating space of 
portfolio managers and shape their 
frames. 
Still, within those constraints, a port-
folio manager must choose assets that 
will bring the best return for a given 
risk profile. Return is the number that 
relates the final value of an investment 
to its initial value (in percent). The 
amount of money at the end of an in-
vestment period consists of the yield, 
like dividends, coupon or interest rate 
payments, as well as the earnings or 
losses due to price changes of the se-
curity. Those prospective flows of 
payment and movements of the asset 
price in the future are uncertain. To 
compare investment alternatives and 
to construct a portfolio, portfolio man-
agers have to be able to forecast the 
returns of those instruments. At this 
point each portfolio manager faces the 
complexity problem. As discussed 
above, due to many unforeseeable 
factors that influence asset prices and 
companies’ dividends, no reliable rules 
exist to predict returns and thus to 
select investments. 
But is it not a problem that all financial 
market professionals face in their eve-
ryday practices? One question that 
may arise regards the specifics of port-
folio managers as an investor group 
and where we should locate them 
within a broad landscape of social 
studies of finance. Langenohl/Schmidt-
Beck (2007) differentiated two groups 
of investment professionals. The first 
group, which consists predominantly 
of traders, is short-term orientated and 
acts in the close proximity to the mar-
kets; long-term orientated market par-
ticipants, for example, securities ana-
lysts, are not involved in the day-to-
day interaction and are concerned with 
collection and processing of informa-
tion in order to make investment deci-
sions. 
Traders find themselves under pres-
sure to react immediately to the num-
bers that they observe on the screens. 
Those numbers are “interpreted not so 
much as information engendering re-
flection but more as an imperative to 
act – that is, to trade” (Lan-
genohl/Schmidt-Beck 2007: 9). Those 
findings are confirmed by Zaloom 
(2003: 261): “The immediacy of the 
market dictates that attention remains 
on the bid-ask figures that represent 
the position of the market at that sec-
ond…Traders can act with little infor-
mation or understanding of the in-
strument they trade or the economic 
conditions of the countries that issue 
them.” Traders have to rely on the im-
mediate real-time market picture pro-
vided by the comprehensive techno-
logical systems. This means that they 
do not effectively deal with the future 
and are not interested in forecasting. 
The representatives of the second 
group analyze economic and compa-
nies’ data and make forecasts, in order 
to give recommendations (“buy,” 
“sell,” or “hold”), i.e., to communicate 
forecasts to the other market partici-
pants. Analysts do not invest money 
effectively, i.e., they are not exposed to 
the market. Their time horizon aver-
ages to “several months up to one 
year” (Langenohl/Schmidt-Beck 2007: 
11). 
Portfolio managers find themselves 
between those two poles. However, it 
should be mentioned that this investor 
group is not homogenous. By dealing 
with complexity, i.e., by answering the 
question about how to forecast returns 
and how to select securities, portfolio 
managers use basically two method-
ologies: fundamental analysis based 
on processing economic data (compa-
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nies’ financial statements, market po-
sition, quality of management, etc.) 
and quantitative analysis that draws 
on the mathematical and statistical 
approaches to assess market move-
ments. 
Fundamental portfolio managers are 
similar in their approach to securities 
analysts. They not rely only on the 
permanently changing numbers on the 
screen but also collect and analyze 
economic data, perform forecasting, 
and decide to buy, to sell, or to hold. 
However, it is important that they must 
implement their decisions, which 
means that they enter the market with 
a particular amount of money. In this 
sense, portfolio managers are con-
stantly exposed to the markets, like 
traders. 
The frequency of interactions with the 
market depends, however, on the 
strategy that portfolio managers fol-
low. There are on the one hand “buy-
and-hold” investors who take a long-
term view and trade less frequently; 
there are also short term oriented 
portfolio managers. 
Due to the distinctive nature of their 
business, portfolio managers face spe-
cific challenges and develop specific 
solutions while dealing with complex-
ity. Those particularities shall be dis-
cussed now based on the empirical 
research. 
4 Data 
Support for this article is based on 
research that was conducted in several 
German and Swiss asset management 
companies and banks during 2007. 
The data pool of the analysis encom-
passes seventeen guided in-depth in-
terviews with financial market profes-
sionals. The respondents work as port-
folio managers in Frankfurt/Main and 
in Zurich for major international in-
vestment banks (fourteen of the inter-
viewees) and for small investment 
boutiques (two of them). One interview 
was conducted with a financial advisor 
and the owner of an independent in-
vestment company. All respondents 
have more than ten years of experience 
in their field. 
Thirteen interviewees predominantly 
pursue a fundamentally driven invest-
ment strategy. Six of them are respon-
sible for European blue chip portfolios, 
two for European small and mid-caps, 
four for emerging markets, and one for 
investments in bonds. Three inter-
viewed portfolio managers elaborate 
quantitative strategies to allocate as-
sets and to manage funds. 
The duration of the each of the sixteen 
in-depth interviews was about 60 min-
utes. Most of the interviews took place 
in person, and only one was conducted 
by telephone. All interviews were re-
corded and transcribed. The evaluation 
included coding and categorizing (see 
Corbin/Strauss 2008). 
5 Dealing with financial market 
complexity 
The general task of portfolio managers 
while dealing with complexity consists 
in establishing “if-then” rules that en-
able them to forecast asset prices and 
to construct a portfolio. As mentioned 
above, there are two general method-
ologies to do this: fundamental and 
quantitative. We will discuss separately 
how complexity reduction at the level 
of the individual portfolio managers 
takes place in those two ways. This 
happens either by applying heuristics 
(simplified, non-formalized rules of 
data processing) or by utilizing formal 
models. In both cases, it can be shown 
how the “man-made” financial mar-
kets’ complexity is maintained, while 
the market players exploit flexibility 
within their frames. 
5.1 Fundamental portfolio manage-
ment and heuristics 
Decisions of portfolio managers – like 
those of other investor groups - are 
framed. Those frames are not individ-
ual products but are influenced by 
many social factors. Some of them 
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were already mentioned: there are 
laws, official rules and processes of the 
investment company, educational re-
quirements, and technical equipment 
available within the organization. 
Those are frames in which portfolio 
managers move to reach their goals. 
Within the frames they develop indi-
vidual rules to deal with the market 
complexity, to which the term heuris-
tics could be applied: “The term heu-
ristics relates to rules or strategies of 
data processing, which often lead rap-
idly and at minor costs to a solution 
that is usually reasonably close to the 
best possible result, but does not 
guarantee it: rules of thumb” (Gold-
berg/von Nitzsch 2004: 49). The most 
common simplification rules such as 
mental accounting, anchoring heuris-
tic, and so forth, were described by 
Kahneman and Tversky in the “Pros-
pect Theory” (1979). In the present 
paper, the term heuristics is used to 
designate individual rules and tools for 
dealing with the financial market com-
plexity, which portfolio managers de-
velop and utilize for their own use. 
These rules are based on the individual 
experiences of each market player. 
Fund managers observe the market 
and define for themselves the most 
important factors of influence and 
causalities. Whenever they have to 
make decisions, they rely on these 
same factors of influence and causali-
ties. They also check them continu-
ously and learn from the results (men-
tal back testing). 
The interviews with the portfolio man-
agers showed that these simplification 
rules and tools are quite heterogene-
ous; i.e., handling the financial market 
complexity differs substantially from 
investor to investor and from invest-
ment company to investment com-
pany. Peter Bernstein (1992) reports on 
the experience of Jack Treynor, a fa-
mous financial theoretician of the 20th 
century. Treynor was working at the 
beginning of his career at the founda-
tion of the University of Yale and in the 
1960s visited the most important in-
vestment organizations in the USA: 
“He was astonished by the diversity he 
discovered: No two were doing alike, 
but every one of them thought they 
were doing it the right way. This was 
very perplexing” (Bernstein 1992: 184). 
Exactly the same picture emerged from 
the analysis of the interviews with to-
day’s portfolio managers: They pursue 
the goal to predict future prices of se-
curities and arrive at these predictions 
in completely different ways. 
First of all, portfolio managers have 
room for maneuvering to further limit 
their investment universe and to re-
duce the number of securities and fac-
tors, about which they are constantly 
concerned. This is demonstrated in the 
following interview with a portfolio 
manager in the bond market (Zurich): 
In general, in order to observe my market 
universe, I use the same data for quite 
some time. For example, in the US I look at 
the two-year and the ten-year treasury4. I 
do not look at the five-year and the thirty-
year. I could have done this. It sometimes 
expands a little… the universe, but I try to 
keep everything the same and clearly ar-
ranged. 
Question: And the economic data? How do 
you collect it? 
What I do, I always look at the same data… 
Of course, I have a subjective picture of the 
priority of the data. For me, for example, 
the job market numbers in the USA have a 
high priority. Concerning the inflation… I 
look at the core CPI5 and such things. 
Other people do this a bit differently. Not 
all people are of the opinion that the job 
market numbers are important. With the 
inflation, they look at normal inflation. Or 
with housing6… there I look a little at eve-
rything, and then I look at the leading indi-
cators for housing. Then there are some 
economic data… I do not pay attention to 
them, I notice them, then I look at “over or 
                                                       
4 Government bonds with a maturity of two 
and ten years. 
5 CPI means consumer price index. It is 
used as a measure of inflation. Core CPI is 
a measure of inflation that excludes certain 
volatile items like food and energy prices. 
6 Housing refers to the monthly number of 
new residential construction projects and 
is considered to be a key indicator of eco-
nomic strength. 
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under expectations” but I leave them actu-
ally aside… and… that way I get my pic-
ture. 
This interview excerpt clearly shows 
that this investor pays attention con-
sistently to certain factors, sorts them 
according to their priority in his own 
mind, and is aware of the fact that 
competitors and colleagues consider 
different criteria. 
Portfolio managers also limit the flood 
of information while they carefully 
select the sources of information that 
they use. As mentioned above, avail-
able sources of information such as 
conversations in person or by phone 
with analysts and brokers, company 
meetings and press conferences, and 
meeting with colleagues are elements 
of frames. However, individual inves-
tors attach different importance to 
them, and, in doing so, define their 
heuristics. For example, some equity 
investors believe that regular meetings 
with the corporate management are 
crucial for success, while others regard 
such meetings purely as a waste of 
time; some rely on the corporate earn-
ings guidance, while others ignore 
those and concentrate on the assess-
ments of analysts and brokers, with 
whom they are in touch on a daily ba-
sis, either by phone or email. Some 
investors rely exclusively on external 
databases and services. Differing sig-
nificance is also assigned to the infor-
mation exchange with colleagues. In 
large investment companies, there is a 
meeting each morning, an investment 
meeting each week or month, regular 
meetings or conference calls with the 
buy-side analysts. Those different 
modes of information exchange are 
regarded by the employees of the or-
ganizations either as useful or a waste 
of time. An interview partner (small 
and mid-caps, Frankfurt/Main) from a 
small asset management company 
reported that there are no formal 
meetings within his organization: The 
informal exchange between the col-
leagues takes place only if necessary; 
this allegedly saves a lot of time. 
The received information is also sys-
tematized completely differently. Some 
portfolio managers simply write 
memos. Some use “home-made” tools 
such as Excel spreadsheets that assist 
them to monitor and evaluate the cor-
porate and market data. Which data 
are included in those spreadsheets and 
which key numbers are computed are 
likewise heuristic: Each portfolio man-
ager decides the matter individually, 
relying on his own experience. Thus, 
consensus expectations, expectations 
built by particular analysts, companies’ 
forecasts as well as actual numbers 
already published by companies, and 
the prognoses of the fund managers 
are utilized as input data for the 
spreadsheets. Depending upon the 
individual portfolio manager, calcula-
tions include relative key numbers like 
PE7, cash flow key numbers, growth 
rates, etc. According to one interview 
partner (an independent financial advi-
sor, Frankfurt/Main), even professional 
investors, who apply the same invest-
ment styles (growth or value), calcu-
late different key numbers in their 
spreadsheets. The regularity of up-
dates also depends on the individual 
investor: The spreadsheets are updated 
before or after the meeting with the 
company management, after the publi-
cation of the quarterly reports, after 
ad-hoc news, etc. 
To evaluate the companies and to 
make investment decisions, some fund 
managers use informal, individually 
designed scoring models, in which the 
fundamental quality and valuation of 
an enterprise are given a score. The 
final score is used as a base for an 
investment decision. This approach is 
applied systematically; however, the 
assignment of the scores is not subject 
to any systematization or calculation, 
but rather to a purely subjective judg-
ment. 
Each portfolio manager tries to gener-
ate a picture of the market or of a 
                                                       
7 PE is the relation of the price to the earn-
ings and is used as a valuation tool. 
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company based upon his own individ-
ual rules and tools. These tools must 
be “comfortable” and fit into the man-
ager’s own philosophy. The following 
fund manager’s statement can be con-
sidered as representative: 
With the help of my spreadsheets, I pro-
duce an image of the company in my head: 
whether the firm grows, how it grows - in 
“doubles digits” or “single digits”, organi-
cally or otherwise. For me, such pictures 
are important to determine the trend. This 
is my way of thinking. (Fund manager, 
European emerging markets, Frank-
furt/Main) 
In the interviews, the portfolio manag-
ers often refer to a picture of the mar-
ket or of a company as a puzzle, which 
develops during the course of applying 
the heuristic rules and tools. The het-
erogeneity of the approaches in han-
dling complexity leads necessarily to 
the diversity of these puzzles’ pictures 
and thus to the diversity of the expec-
tations and decisions that are based 
on them. 
However, it seems that diversity of 
individual approaches is desirable for 
investment companies. Beunza/Stark 
(2004: 395) demonstrated in their pa-
per that in the case of arbitrage trad-
ers, the trading room is organized in 
the way that diversity of calculations is 
maintained; uniformity is not wel-
comed. Interviews with portfolio man-
agers show as well that different ap-
proaches are used within the same 
banking house or asset management 
company. Two portfolio managers, 
who are active in the same investment 
company but at different branch of-
fices in Zurich and in Frankfurt, re-
ported on two completely different 
investment processes. In Zurich, the 
process is strongly formalized, it is a 
team- and model-based investment 
process; in Frankfurt, each portfolio 
manager is completely free in design-
ing his own investment strategy. Some 
investment companies knowingly al-
low the heterogeneity of the ap-
proaches. For example, the portfolio 
manager of Jupiter's Global Managed 
Fund, who has nine other managers in 
his team, stated: “I encourage each of 
the managers to do their own thing, to 
run their fund in the way they want to 
run it” (Kelleher 2007: 11). 
Now we have a picture of portfolio 
managers who reduce complexity non-
uniformly. They use available elements 
of their framing devices and combine 
them differently. The tightness of the 
free space is highly determined by the 
organizational rules, but such free 
space always exists. 
This picture is applicable because the 
asset management industry is still a 
highly individual business. It relies on 
the experts, the individual portfolio 
managers, who supposedly earn over 
years a better profit than the market 
average or the competition. The in-
vestment companies rely on the indi-
viduals, “the gold fingers” 
(Döhle/Hetzer/Palan 2002: 154-164). At 
the same time, however, the weak-
nesses of those key players are becom-
ing ever more apparent to the industry: 
Lacking discipline, possessing limited 
capacities in data processing, and de-
pending on emotion jeopardize the 
performance of the active fund manag-
ers. The solution is expected from the 
consistent application of the comput-
erized strategies. 
5.2 Formal Models 
An alternative method to deal with the 
complexity in the market is the use of 
formalized, computer-assisted models. 
The associations between the factors 
of influence and their effects are de-
termined with the help of statistical 
procedures. Computers analyze past 
data and determine which factors, un-
der what type of conditions, were sig-
nificant for the outperformance of cer-
tain securities. These analyses then 
serve to predict what factors will be 
significant in the future. As in the case 
of heuristics, the number of factors to 
be considered is deliberately limited, 
and the associations between those 
factors are ascertained. The computer-
ized strategies of the complexity re-
duction are, however, not based on 
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human experience, but rather on the 
statistic analyses. 
Quantitative models are elements of 
the portfolio managers’ frames. They 
are often relatively similar to each 
other. A portfolio manager (quantita-
tive asset allocation, Zurich) described 
the formalized tools that are used in 
her bank as follows: 
We have valuation… What we naturally 
also have, is momentum, we have senti-
ment and cyclical forces.8 It is exactly alike 
in every other asset management shop. 
One of the reasons for the models’ 
similarity is the fact that the experts, 
who program and use quantitative 
tools, are trained at the universities in 
the same mathematical methods. In 
addition, the successful strategies are 
rather quickly imitated (Gangahar 
2007: 7). Quantitative portfolio man-
agers observe each other’s products 
and adopt and modify some of them. 
One quantitative expert, introducing 
tools developed in his division, used 
the word “steal” several times: “We 
stole this model from this and this 
bank,” and it seems to be a common 
practice. 
Given this tendency, the question 
arises about whether the application of 
the computer models can reduce the 
market complexity to such an extent 
that the markets could no longer be 
maintained. Here we are addressing 
the problem of “computer herding”: If 
the investors judge the market with the 
same or similar formal models, i.e., 
reduce the complexity in the same 
way, they will also have the same or 
similar expectations and make the 
same decisions. This means that all of 
them would favor the same side of the 
market. In other words, they would 
                                                       
                                                      
8 Valuation, momentum, and sentiment are 
techniques to assess securities and mar-
kets. Valuation helps to estimate the mar-
ket value of an asset and to decide if it is 
expensive or cheap. Momentum refers to 
the dynamics of price movements. Senti-
ment indicators gauge investor attitudes 
toward the market. Cyclical forces refer to 
the influence of the general business cycle. 
want only to buy at the same time or 
only to sell at the same time. This 
would cause the other side of the mar-
ket to thin out and threaten the mar-
ket’s existence. 
For example, the implementation of 
similar stop-loss strategies for the 
computer-controlled portfolio insur-
ances was one of the factors that 
caused the stock market crisis in 1987 
(see Authers 2007: 9). In August 2007, 
the unfavorable developments of some 
qualitatively managed hedge funds 
caused similar turbulences in the mar-
ket. A global quantitative equity fund 
of Goldman Sachs lost 30 per cent of 
its value within one week because the 
computers could not foresee some 
market movements and as a result 
implemented a wrong strategy. Many 
other computer-managed investment 
funds experienced the same fate and 
caused the drastic price fall in the mar-
ket (Tett/Gangahar 2007: 7). 
With this in mind, we must raise the 
question of whether complexity is re-
duced in the field of the quantitative 
portfolio management nearly uni-
formly, within the very tight frames. 
Currently, we cannot assert that. Since 
each investment company and each 
portfolio manager still develop their 
own models, the models are not abso-
lutely identical. The diversity is also 
caused by the fact that all preliminary 
modeling decisions are made by hu-
mans. During the process of “crafting” 
the models,9 the experts determine 
individually which data sources are 
utilized, which data are collected and 
processed, as well as how individual 
parameters are modeled. 
In addition, many portfolio managers 
are still convinced of the fact that nu-
merous important parameters are not 
quantifiable. The fund advisor Nils 
Bartram from Hauck & Aufhäuser com-
mented: “There are soft factors, which 
are very important for the future share 
 
9 Several interviewees termed the process 
of modeling as “crafting” the models. 
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development, which you cannot press 
into any Excel tables” (Hussla 2007: 
26). The qualitative factors (the man-
agement quality, the value of a brand, 
corporate governance, etc.) are taken 
into consideration only in the form of 
subjective estimations. This subjectiv-
ity causes inaccuracy. A portfolio man-
ager (European emerging markets, 
Zurich) describes the problems of the 
application of a formal valuation 
model: 
Our funds performed badly in the last year 
because input data for the models are mere 
subjective estimations. During the last 
year, we assessed the growth of the Chi-
nese market too low; accordingly we esti-
mated the oil price at around 33 USD (we 
are maintaining this forecast still10). That 
led to the fact that the macro data, which 
were fed into the model, were wrong; eve-
rything was wrong then. Garbage in - gar-
bage out. That is our central problem with 
models. 
The leeway, which exists when “feed-
ing” the models, leads to heterogene-
ous statements and decisions and pre-
vents a radical complexity reduction in 
the market. 
Flexibility often exists also during the 
implementation of the computer-based 
strategies. The extent of the flexibility 
depends particularly on the policy of 
the investment companies; i.e., an in-
stitution decides again how tight 
frames are. Some insist on the radical 
implementation of the strategies han-
dled by the computers because only in 
this way can the advantages of the 
qualitative investment be completely 
exhausted. 
However, some investment companies 
allow the last decision to be made by 
humans. They permit the fund manag-
ers to bring in their experiences and 
their feelings for the market and to 
implement the models’ recommenda-
tions or not Portfolio managers term 
this procedure a “qualitative overlay.” 
One of them (tactical asset allocation, 
Zurich) describes it as follows: 
                                                       
                                                      
10 March 2007. 
In the end, the whole is, to be honest, a 
qualitative decision. We decide how serious 
we take the valuation signal, for example. 
It is an overlay when we say “OK, the yen 
is, according to the purchasing-power par-
ity model, strongly undervalued, but the 
macroeconomic parameters don’t look 
good…it is unlikely, that the Bank of Japan 
increase the interest rates, and so on.” For 
this reason we don’t take a strong position 
in yen. It is a typical decision. Very qualita-
tive. 
The interviews confirm that creative 
intuition, interpretations, story telling, 
metaphors, and fantasies principally 
supplement formal methods of han-
dling and thus maintaining the com-
plexity in the markets. The portfolio 
managers still do not trust the formal 
methods entirely and use them only as 
supporting tools for their decisions. In 
general, the flexibility in implementing 
the models’ strategies is considered as 
a central condition of their application. 
Here is an example: 
It is important to know, what is going on in 
a company. If a model recommends buying 
a cheap company, I must know why it is 
cheap. For example, Surgut11 is cheap, it 
has been cheap for a long time, but the 
reason for this is known: its management. 
Prosperity fund (a large shareholder) plans 
a management change within the com-
pany. If that finally happens, if the previous 
managers are fired and a new team is 
hired, the Surgut will double, and it will be 
a good deal. Until then it remains uninter-
esting, no matter how cheap it is. (Fund 
manager, European emerging markets, 
Frankfurt/Main) 
The head of the “Quantitative Strate-
gies and Risk Research” department in 
a big investment house in Frank-
furt/Main described three generally 
possible handling of model outcomes: 
We have three basic approaches… First of 
all, we have a strong research supply for all 
fund managers; they can access this re-
search freely and without restrictions, but 
they are not obliged (that’s an important 
point!). Then there is overlay advisory. For 
example, we have a signal… equity market 
or bond market short-long (we keep it 
simple), then we have a portfolio manager 
who has a broad bond fund and who says, 
 
11 Surgutneftegaz is one of the major listed 
oil and gas companies in Russia. 
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“The model which signals short-long is a 
good model.” He receives then an e-mail 
from us whenever we have a new signal 
and implements it 1:1. The next stage is 
that we work with model portfolios. It is 
usually the case when we have an invest-
ment process where we say, “The first step 
is the quantitative approach,” for example 
screening over many equities… we prepare 
the list of hundred most interesting equi-
ties and allocate the model portfolio. In the 
first stage of the investment process there 
is this input, in the second stage the fund 
manager checks, “Does the whole thing 
fit?” … he adjusts the whole thing, makes 
an explicit overlay… We distinguish it in-
ternally: it is a model portfolio if concrete 
weightings are assigned; it is a pure re-
search if it is just a list, a ranking. 
The interview shows that there are 
three ways to handle the results of 
quantitative departments within one 
investment company. The free space of 
portfolio managers depends on the 
product that they manage and on the 
company’s strategy. But if there are no 
clear instructions to use a model, the 
personal opinion about models (“the 
model is a good model”) is crucial. In 
other words, models are a part of 
frames, but they do not always have to 
be used. 
The existence of the qualitative overlay 
suggests that skepticism about the 
usefulness of formal models often pre-
vails. Generally, it is argued: “There are 
many useful areas for investment 
judgment where quantitative models 
never become practicable. In 1996, 
what did investors say would be the 
impact on Hong Kong stock values 
when that British colony reverts to 
mainland China in 1997? There are 
simply not enough cases of very simi-
lar type to do a least-square regression 
of returns versus possible governing 
factors. One may do better by forming 
a subjective judgment, reasoning from 
cases that are similar enough to offer 
analogy, but that are not similar 
enough to use for statistical analysis” 
(Wilcox 1997: 66). In other words, 
there are always new factors added, 
which are not considered in any model 
and which must be programmed af-
terwards. In the interviews, the sub-
prime crisis was mentioned as such a 
factor. A portfolio manager (tactical 
asset allocation, Zurich) reported that 
she just started to integrate this new 
factor into her models in December 
2007, when the crisis was already in 
full swing. She described the inclusion 
of the new factor as a creative process, 
which her competitors perhaps ar-
range similarly, but differently, so that 
their models generate a different out-
put. 
Models prove to be highly imperfect 
instruments for handling complexity 
because they are not capable of cap-
turing all relevant factors and deter-
mining causal relations between them. 
Models cannot supply clear forecasts 
because they cannot sufficiently take 
into consideration the dynamics of the 
relevant factors, particularly their 
changes as well as the emergence of 
new factors. An interview partner 
(bond portfolio manager, Zurich) re-
ported on his experience with an inter-
est rate model: 
Years ago I also created some models: 
regression and factor models and so on. 
Those functioned very well for some time, 
for about two years, but then there were 
shocks. For example, the Asia crisis, the 
Emerging Markets crisis and LTCM12, also 
the Russian default13. In any case, every-
thing went completely wrong. The model 
said six percent, and the interest rate was 
four percent. Previously the difference had 
been in the range of 20-30 basis points; 
thus, it had been correct. Nevertheless, all 
of a sudden, nothing could be done with it. 
In the original format that I had conceptu-
alized, the model was no longer useful. The 
dominant factor in the market became “the 
escape into the quality”; the bonds rose, 
the equity fell due to this one particular 
factor. And this factor was not included 
into the model. If I had taken in my model 
the variable “Emerging Markets Spreads,” 
then it would have functioned very well. 
However, that was originally not included. 
                                                       
12 LTCM: A large hedge fund that put the 
global financial system at risk as a result of 
its collapse in 1998. 
13 Russian default: Financial crisis in Rus-
sia, which led to the suspension of debt 
payment of the Russian state in 1998 
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The relations between the market-
relevant factors cannot clearly be de-
termined for a sufficiently long period. 
As William Strazzullo, the Chief Market 
Strategist at Bell Curve Trading, put it: 
“When they [models] work, it’s good, 
but over time relationships [between 
the factors included in the model] in-
evitably break down” (Gangahar 2007: 
7). Complexity is reduced by the appli-
cation of the models only temporarily 
and rather seemingly. 
Handling the models is an additional 
complexity factor in the financial mar-
ket and represents a fundamental 
problem for all model users. A uniform 
model determining the different mar-
ket parameters does not exist. A port-
folio manager (quantitative asset allo-
cation, Zurich) reported that she runs 
several models simultaneously, in or-
der to compute parameters such as 
momentum or sentiment; each of the 
models, estimating the same parame-
ter, can produce different recommen-
dations. As a result, the problem of the 
model combination develops: How 
does one deal with the different rec-
ommendations of the models that de-
termine the same parameters? Today’s 
market players consider this as a cen-
tral problem: 
This is something where investment man-
agers really differ. Because the tools are 
always the same: a little of DCF14 or, my 
God, do I take the equilibrium interest rate 
or the latest short term … oh, that is trivial: 
we look at it, we know the outcome. The 
question is: How does the model combina-
tion work? And this is what makes the 
shops different (quantitative asset alloca-
tion, Zurich). 
Model combination is a problem, 
which develops the market complexity 
in the process of the quantitative han-
dling. Portfolio managers, who use 
formal computer-assisted methods, 
must judge how they include the quan-
titative parameters in their decision-
making processes, while those pa-
                                                       
14 DCF refers to the Discounted Cash Flow 
model: Valuation tool based on estimated 
future cash Flows. 
rameters are differently determined by 
computers. Hence, they are confronted 
with another complex problem, which 
again can be solved either with the 
help of heuristics (subjective judg-
ment) or with formal methods of 
model combination (model mixing, 
model synthesis, model switching, 
etc.). In other words, the market par-
ticipants treat the problem of the 
model combination, like all other mar-
ket problems, in different ways. This 
guarantees the heterogeneity of expec-
tations and decisions in the market 
and at the same time produces addi-
tional complexity. Financial market 
complexity remains “man-made.” 
In addition, the models themselves 
must be considered as a complexity 
factor. They become a factor of influ-
ence because their interaction, as al-
ready suggested, affects the market. 
Problems like “computer herding” and 
“model combination” give evidence 
that the application of models in-
creases the complexity in the markets 
rather than drastically decreasing it. 
With MacKenzie (2006), it can be as-
sumed here that financial models are 
not “recording equipment” (cameras), 
but also “engines,” which became an 
independent and substantial part of 
the economic processes. Thus, if mod-
els evaluate markets and compute the 
investment strategies, they have to 
include themselves as a factor of influ-
ence in their calculations. However, 
this is what they cannot do, meaning 
that they cannot record and capture 
the total complexity of the markets. 
Their use provokes the diversity of 
decisions and results in an increase of 
the market complexity. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, it has been shown that, 
though the practice of portfolio man-
agers is tightly framed by law, financial 
institutions, education, and techno-
logical tools, there is room for portfo-
lio managers to use those frames in-
dependently and non-uniformly. We 
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demonstrated the flexible use of those 
rooms by discussing both ways of the 
complexity reduction at the individual 
level: heuristics and formal models. 
The application of heuristics, i.e., the 
individual rules and tools of data proc-
essing, leads to the diversity of the 
investors’ approaches. Investors either 
choose which elements of the frame 
(analysts’ reports, management meet-
ings, communication with colleagues) 
they effectively use, or they create their 
own tools like individual spreadsheets 
or scoring models within the given 
frames. Heuristics vary very strongly. 
Though complicated formal tools, 
which are based on the mathematical 
models, show a tendency to standardi-
zation, we also find here significant 
flexibility in their usage. Models are 
not uniformly conceptualized and 
“fed”; their results are often subject to 
interpretation and discussion (“quali-
tative overlay”). The existence of room 
for maneuvering in utilizing formal 
models is considered by market par-
ticipants as a necessary condition for 
the use of models at all. Formal tools 
also produce problems, for example, 
model combination, which requires 
individual creative solutions within 
existing frames. 
In other words, there are heterogene-
ous ways of complexity reduction 
within frames. Financial market com-
plexity is thus not a result of the inter-
play of identical actors with straight-
forward frames that are uniformly 
used. This finding is important because 
it draws attention to the question of 
the complexity emergence. It could be 
suggested that the discovered diversity 
contributes to the emergence and 
maintenance of market complexity at 
the macro level. Financial market 
complexity is caused not just by recip-
rocity of actors who are primitive and 
comprehensible in their way (like 
Brownian particles). There is also 
complexity at the micro level that has 
to be taken into consideration. Atten-
tion should be paid to the question of 
how complexity in the financial mar-
kets is generated, as each individual 
participant tries to reduce it. 
There are already inquiries of this kind 
in the economic theory of complexity. 
Arthur et al. (1996) showed, for exam-
ple, by means of computer simula-
tions, that if we assume heterogeneous 
financial market participants and their 
interdependence and let them adopt 
their beliefs quickly, then “the market 
self-organizes into a complex regime” 
(Arthur et al, 1996: 4). Bubbles and 
crashes occur, and prices show com-
plex statistical features. This mecha-
nism should be explored more closely 
from the sociological point of view. 
Interviews are obviously an insufficient 
tool to deal with this problem. Partici-
pant observations and further methods 
of empirical research are required. But 
this coupling between heterogeneity of 
individual ways of handling complexity 
and the emergence of complexity at 
the macro level should be considered 
as the next step of research. 
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